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A REASSESSMENT OF TARA PETROLEUM CORP.
V. HUGHEY-A CASE OF TEMPORARY
CONVENIENCE
Marc F. Conley*
Under the new law and the facts of Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey, an Oklahoma farmer with a bargained for market price roy-
alty lease would have received approximately $3,300.00 in royalties for
10,000 Mcf royalty gas. If his farm had been located in Texas, Kansas,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, or possibly Louisiana or Arkansas,
he may have received approximately $13,000.0 in royalties for the same
gas production. This Article confronts the problems inherent in the Tara
decision and suggests alternatives for determining the market value cal-
culation of royalties in light of decisions from other jurisdictions which
have addressed these same problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey,' construing a market price gas royalty clause in an oil
and gas lease. Simply stated, the court ruled that a lessee's obligation to
pay royalty under a market price lease provision is satisfied by payment
based upon the lessee's gas sales contract price, assuming that the con-
* Partner, Houston and Klein, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.S., 1970, Oklahoma State Univer-
sity; J.D., 1979, University of Tulsa.
1. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). Justice Lavender issued the written opinion, with Chief Justice
Barnes, and Justices Hodges, Simms, Doolin, Hargrave, and Opala, concurring. Justices Irwin and
Williams dissented without a written opinion.
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tract was fair and reasonable at the time it was made.2 In Tara, the
Oklahoma court decided a diverse and controversial issue contrary to the
great weight of authority from other oil and gas producing states.3
The history and development of differing lines of authority on this
subject, as well as the gas market conditions which from time to time
have increased litigation concerning gas contracts, have been extensively
discussed by other commentators.4 This Article will explore this histori-
cal and economic background only as is necessary. The focus instead
2. Id. at 1274.
3. The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted decisions to the contrary from the Fifth Circuit,
Texas, Kansas, and Montana. Id. at 1272 nn.4-7 (citing J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104
(5th Cir. 1966), and Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964) (both of which applied
Texas law); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87, 586 P.2d 298 (1978); Lighteap v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968, no writ)). In the Montana Power case, the lessee was also the
producer, purchaser, and distributor of the gas in dispute; therefore, the entire agreement between
the parties was contained in the lease. Accordingly, the Montana court was not presented a case of
lessee hardship arising from a separate long-term gas contract. Montana Power, 179 Mont. at -,
586 P.2d at 300. Nonetheless, the Montana court's decision is instructive on the definition of "mar-
ket price" which was construed as the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it
was produced. Id. at 302. The Montana Supreme Court also addressed the method of proof of
market value, stating the test as: "Where no market exists in the field, in the absence of unlawful
combination or suppression of price, royalty may be computed upon receipts from the marketing
outlet for the products, less the costs and expenses of marketing and transportation." Id. at 303
(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1946); Johnson v. Jernigan, 475
P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1970); R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.4 (1971)). Cf. Lippert
v. Angle, 211 Kan. 695, 508 P.2d 920, 926 (1973) (court examines independent proof of comparable
sales under similar or substantially similar conditions).
4. See, eg., Scully, The Market Price Gas Royalty Clause: Lessee's Nightmare Outside
Oklahoma-Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 35 Sw. L.J. 1079, 1083 (1982); see generally R. HEM-
INGWAY, supra note 3, § 7.1 (discussion of royalties for casinghead gas and its by-products under
modem lease provisions). In fact, the issues litigated in Tara had been widely discussed prior to the
Oklahoma decision, with the commentary accurately described by Justice Lavender as critical of the
cases from other juridsictions noted supra, note 3. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273 nn.8-10. Commentary
subsequent to the Tara decision, however, has been favorable to the Tara rule. See Lowe, Eastern
Oil and Gas Operations: Do Recent Developments Suggest New Answers to Old Problems?, 4 E. MIN.
L. INST. 20-1, § 20.03[2], at 20-32 (1983); Lowe, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil and Gas Law:
Issues of the Eighties, 35 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1 (1984); Scully, supra, at 1092-94; Note,
Oil and Gas: Market Price Under a Long-Term Gas Contract-Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 35
OKLA. L. REv. 427 (1982); Note, Market Value and Long-Term Purchase Contracts: Tara Petro-
leum Corp. v. Hughey; 17 TULSA L.J. 566 (1982). Nonetheless, the case law subsequent to Tara,
with the exception of Arkansas, see infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text, have rejected the
Tara type of judicial revision of oil and gas leases to favor the lessee. Although the Louisiana deci-
sions subsequent to Tara do not support Tara's unqualified lease construction rule, see infra
notes166-69 and accompanying text, some noted authors have enthusiastically grouped Louisiana
with Oklahoma and Arkansas as following the Tara ruling. Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operations,
supra § 20.03[2], at 20-32; 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 650.4, at 650.25-.26
(1984) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. However, both of these sources appear to have
recognized that the latest pronouncement of the Louisiana Supreme Court may take Louisiana out
of the column of pro-Tara jurisdictions. Lowe, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil and Gas Law:
Issues of the Eighties, supra, at 6; WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra, § 650.4, at 650.26. For a further
listing of related articles, see WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra, § 650.4, at 650.17 n.9.
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will be upon the extent to which the court in Tara, as well as courts in
other jurisdictions, have been willing to engage in judicial alteration,
modification, and impairment of private contracts to reach a given
result.5
The problems involved in the exploration, production, and market-
ing of natural gas for profit are of relatively modem vintage. Generally,
prior to World War II, the incidental discovery of natural gas by produ-
cers of oil was considered a nuisance.6 Since such gas had no readily
available market, oil producers customarily dealt with this troublesome
by-product by flaring it into the air.7 Subsequently, a market was created
and served by a spreading national network of gas collection and distri-
bution pipeline systems, thereby fostering the evolution of various mod-
em gas royalty lease provisions.8
There are a number of material variations in standard gas royalty
lease clauses describing the basis upon which the royalty owner will be
paid for his proportionate share of gas production.9 One difficulty in
comparing and contrasting principal cases determining the lessee's liabil-
ity to the royalty owner has perhaps been the differing lease language
involved in the disputed royalty clauses.1" For instance, in Tara the
Oklahoma court limited its decision to a market price clause while noting
common usage of royalty clauses generally described as market value,
gross proceeds, net proceeds, and in kind." These distinctions in lease
clause language were developed by oil and gas lease draftsmen who, it is
commonly thought, were mindful of certain policies and objectives per-
taining to these lease clauses.1 2 Inherent dangers exist, however, in at-
5. See infra notes 89-92, 121-22, 211-12 and accompanying text.
6. Morris, The Gas Royalty Clause-Tat is Market Value? 25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 63, 64-66 (1974).
7. Id.
8. See 3 E. KuNTz, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 40.1, at 291 (1967) (explaining the effect of gas
distribution on lease provisions).
9. Indeed, these variations make the establishment of blanket rules of construction both diffi-
cult and, as in the case of Tara, unwise.
10. See infra discussion of case law from other jurisdictions.
11. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272 n.3. While the Tara decision at least implied that a distinction
exists between market price and market value royalty clauses, the courts of other jurisdictions have
generally treated the terms as synonymous. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, § 643.2, at 525-26.
12. See, e.g., Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operations, supra note 4, § 20.03[2], at 30. Still, what
industry draftsmen may have had in mind in drawing standard lease clauses throws little light on the
intent of the parties to any given oil and gas lease. If the source of the drafting of leases has any
significance in this type of dispute, it is in the application of the rule requiring construction of a
document most strictly against the party who has created the need for such construction. See infra
notes 237-39 and accompanying text. There is little justification for considering the term "market
price" to be ambiguous and in need ofjudicial construction. However, if the court has reached that
point, then a lessee who supplies the language and terms within the lease should be held to a strict
1985]
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tempting to employ printed form or boilerplate language to cover a
variety of intended transactions and commercial goals. Greater precision
in the drafting of gas royalty provisions over the past fifty years could
likely have resulted in substantial savings in litigation costs to both les-
sees and lessors and, in turn, to consumers.13 Interestingly, the oil and
gas industry has not been without highly accurate prophecies of such
lease language difficulty. As A. W. Walker Jr. observed:
Too much care cannot be devoted to the preparation of a royalty
clause in an oil and gas lease. The prospective payment of royalties of
great monetary value is involved, potentially at least, in the drafting of
every lease, and any slight error in content or terminology is apt to
prove exceedingly costly. 14
Still, the exigencies of the leasing industry are probably sufficient to
explain most failures to heed such forecasts of lease construction
problems. With leases commonly entered into between land and mineral
owners on the one side, and landmen representing lessees on the other,
the ready availability of a few standard lease clause provisions provided
the environment for increasingly frequent litigation over gas royalty
clauses. In fact, it was generally not until economic factors resulted in a
drastic and rapid escalation of the market price for natural gas 15 that fine
distinctions in lease language began to bring to the forefront many of Mr.
Walker's early concerns of more than a half century ago. In light of the
discussion to follow, however, to the extent that some courts have con-
strued patently unambiguous lease language as "ambiguous" and re-
solved the same by application of questionable standards of
interpretation, 6 it is certainly arguable that no amount of care in draft-
ing royalty provisions would have substantially reduced the number and
intensity of disputes over accountability for gas production.
II. THE TARA DECISION
The royalty dispute decided in Tara arose from an oil and gas lease
construction in favor of the lessor. See, eg., 2 W. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 232 (perm. ed.
1959); WILLIAMS & MEYER, supra note 4, § 628 (1981).
13. For instance, the Kansas Supreme Court, in deciding Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221
Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977), noted that there may have been at that time as many as three hundred
similar cases pending in the Kansas district courts. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 3. See also Lowe, Eastern
Oil and Gas Operations, supra note 4, at 20-29.
14. Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 10
TEx. L. REv. 291 (1932). Walker's concern was reiterated in 1974 by another learned commentator,
Joseph W. Morris. See Morris, supra note 6, at 63-64.
15. Such a dramatic increase in the free market price of gas in the 1970's is illustrated in Scully,
supra note 4, at 1079 n.4.
16. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20:519
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(the "Hughey lease") executed in 1973 to Tara Petroleum Corporation.17
In 1976, after unsuccessful exploration and several assignments, Wilcoy
Petroleum Company began to operate the lease. 8 A producing gas well
was drilled that year. Prior to any production, Wilcoy contracted to sell
the gas produced to Jarrett Oil Company.' 9 The Wilcoy/Jarrett gas
purchase contract was for a two-year term with automatic year-to-year
extensions. The contract was terminable at the will of either party at the
end of the initial two-year term or at the end of any subsequent annual
extension.20 The Hughey lease gas royalty provision, described by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court as a standard market price royalty clause,2'
provided for gas royalty as follows:
In consideration of the premises the said lessee covenants and
agrees:
2nd. To pay lessor for gas of whatsoever nature and kind pro-
duced and sold or used off the premises, or used in the manufacture of
any products therefrom, one-eighth (1/8) at the market price at the well
for the gas sold, used off the premises, or in the manufacture of prod-
ucts therefrom, said payments to be made monthly .... 22
The Hughey well began producing gas which was sold to Jarrett
under the Wilcoy/Jarrett contract until Wilcoy terminated the contract
at the end of the initial two-year term.23 Royalties paid during that two-
17. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1271. With the disputed lease having been entered into subsequent to
fierce litigation over market price royalty clauses in other jurisdictions, the burden should have fallen
even heavier upon the drafter of the lease to specificially provide a proceeds royalty clause if desired.
18. Id. It should be noted that the lease in question had been subject to assignments, as have
many of the leases disputed in the cases discussed in this Article. The cases speak in terms of the
lessor or royalty owner on the one side of the question, and the lessee, producer, operator, or work-
ing interest owner on the other. For simplification, the royalty owner will be referred to throughout
as the lessor while the party bearing the obligation to pay the royalty as the lessee.
19. Id. The Tara rule includes a requirement that the gas contract be entered into at arm's
length. The argument was made that Jarrett Oil Company and Tara Petroleum Corporation were
jointly owned and subject to common control. Id. at 1275. The court indicated that had common
control been approved, the lessor would have been entitled to the higher price received on resale to
the related entity. In the absence of any proof of conmon control, the Tara court declined to specu-
late as to such common ownership. Id. In the event of a collusive sale between lessee and purchaser,
the Oklahoma court would apparently require the lessor to meet the standard of proof for disregard-
ing separate corporate legal entities. Id. The Oklahoma rule for disregarding such entities requires a
showing that the separate corporation exists as a tool to perpetrate fraud or that the corporations are
so organized and controlled that one is a mere instrumentality of another. See Wallace v. Tulsa
Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 18, 61 P.2d 645, 648 (1936).
20. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1271. The absence of a long-term gas contract in Tara renders the court's
discussion of industry custom and long-term contracts inconsistent and indicates the desire of the
court to favor the lessee despite the actual facts.
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
22. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272.
23. Id. at 1271. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
19851
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year period were calculated on the Wilcoy/Jarrett contract price. 24
During the term of the Wilcoy/Jarrett contract, Jarrett resold gas
from the Hughey well to El Paso Natural Gas Company under a contract
price equal to the ceiling permitted by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC). z5 The dispute arose when the FPC ceiling price increased sub-
stantially during the term of the Wilcoy/Jarrett contract.26 While Jarrett
paid Wilcoy thirty-two cents per Mcf during the first year of their con-
tract, and thirty-three cents during the second year, Jarrett received sub-
stantially greater amounts for the gas from El Paso.27 In fact, during this
two-year period, the El Paso/Jarrett contract price increased to almost a
$1.30 per Mcf.28 At the same time, Jarrett accounted to the Hughey
lessors for royalty based upon the thirty-two cents and thirty-three cents
rate established by the contract with Wilcoy.29
The lessors, relying on their lease's market price royalty provision,
claimed royalties calculated on the El Paso/Jarrett contract price rather
than on the Wilcoy/Jarrett price.3" The District Court of Geer County
agreed with the lessors and awarded $18,000.00 in additional royalties,
entering a money judgment against Tara (the original lessee) and Jarrett
(the first purchaser), while granting judgment for the producer Wilcoy
against the lessor.3 Tara and Jarrett both appealed; the plaintiff-lessor
failed to appeal the judgment rendered in favor of Wilcoy, the pro-
ducer.32 Justice Lavender of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, with six
justices concurring, reversed the trial court.33
The Oklahoma Supreme Court framed the dispositive issue as
whether a lessor with a market price gas royalty clause is entitled to roy-
alty calculated on the highest current price in the field.34 By so charac-
24. Id.
25. Id. Because of its equation of market price with proceeds under these circumstances, the
Oklahoma court did not reach the question of whether regulated markets are a relevant figure in
determining market price under evidence of comparable sales. Cf infra notes 139-41 and accompa-
nying text.




30. Id. at 1272. The lessor's theory, based in part on an unsupported argument of the common
control of Tara Petroleum Corporation and Jarrett Oil Company, did not directly address the ques-
tion of whether a lessor may seek judgment against the purchaser in an arm's length transaction for
additional royalties owed.
31. 630 P.2d at 1272.
32. Id.
33. See supra note I and accompanying text.
34. 630 P.2d at 1272. It would be unfair to the court to suggest this to be an inaccurate charac-
terization of the dispute, in that the additional royalties actually sought in this case were so calcu-
[Vol. 20:519
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terizing the issue, the court took an additional and unnecessary step by
expanding the scope of the issue in order to determine if the producer's
contract price, here the price paid Wilcoy by Jarrett, was the "market
price" for the purpose of discharging the gas royalty obligation.35
To reach its equation that the lease market price was equal to the
producer's contract price, the court relied upon familiar commentary to
find the disputed royalty provision ambiguous and, therefore, in need of
further interpretation. 6 Arguably the provision was unclear. If the roy-
alty was to be based upon the producer's proceeds, clear standardized
language was available to achieve that end37 but was not employed in the
lease. Similarly, standard lease provisions existed for royalty to be based
on market value.3 8 Nonetheless, in construing market price as used in
the Hughey lease, the court engaged in an analysis of questionable valid-
ity, previously and subsequently rejected by well-reasoned decisions of
other jurisdictions.39 Upon suggesting that the disputed lease term was
ambiguous,' the court employed consideration of industry practices
which it felt practically and fairly supported its result but which simply
were inapplicable to the facts in evidence.
Noting the producer's duty to market gas from a producing well,
41
the court observed the usual necessity of entering into long-term gas
lated. No Oklahoma decision has to date combined a dispute over a market price royalty clause with
the question of whether the lessee is obligated to seek the prevailing price for the lessor's gas. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma indicated such a duty does exist
in Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969), afd, 421 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1970). The court in Craig relied in part upon Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit,
275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954). However, the Oklahoma cases commonly known as the West Hunton
Lime cases, which culminated in Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978), dealt with the
obligation of the operator under a statutorily created unit. These cases are inextricably entwined
with constitutional questions relating to compulsory unitization statutes. Olansen, 587 P.2d at 982-
83. Whether or not these principles apply to the relationship between a lessor and lessee in the
absence of compulsory unitization is beyond the scope of this Article.
35. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272-73.
36. The Oklahoma court cited 3A W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS § 589, at 22-23 (2d ed. W. Flittie
Supp. 1980), as characterizing the typical market price royalty clause as "freighted with inherent
ambiguity." Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273.
37. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 643.2, at 526-27. The Oklahoma court recog-
nized the existence of other such typical gas royalty clauses. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272 n.3.
38. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 643.2, at 525-26.
39. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
40. The court did not directly rule that the term market price in a royalty clause is ambiguous.
Nonetheless, authority is quoted within the text of the opinion to that effect. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
41. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273 n.11 (citing McVicker v. Horn, Robinson, & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410,
414 (Okla. 1958)).
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purchase contracts.4" Additionally, the lessor and lessee were presumed
to possess knowledge of this practice when negotiating the lease.43 Thus,
the court reasoned that while gas prices may fluctuate substantially, the
producer's revenues remain constant.44 Therefore, the producer was
held to be unfairly treated by any ruling which would result in the les-
sor's royalty share taking a steadily increasing portion of the producer's
revenue.45 In fact, the Wilcoy/Jarrett contract was of two years dura-
tion, and was terminated after that initial term. Whatever inherent ineq-
uity may arise from requiring a lessee to account for royalties
independent of the proceeds received under a ten-year or twenty-year
term gas purchase contract,46 those inequities simply did not exist in
Tara.47
It is true that, under the facts of Tara, if market price had been
determined to be the El Paso/Jarrett contract price, the lessor's royalty
would have eventually equaled approximately one-half of Wilcoy's reve-
nues.4 8 As noted above,49 however, this result could have been avoided
without reaching the imprudent equation of contract and market price.
42. Id. n.12 (citing Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109, 113
(Okla. 1973)).
43. Id. at 1273. The existence of such knowledge, if properly charged to both parties to the
lease, particularly within the time frame of the Tara dispute, should place a greater burden of using
specific language on the drafter of the lease.
44. Id.
45. Id. This finding of unfairness is countered by the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Piney
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), which concluded the
Tara rule to be unfair to lessors on the basis that the lessor may elect a royalty based on a smaller
fraction of market price, rather than a greater portion of proceeds, upon an expectation that market
price will increase. Id. at 237. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Tara's rearrangement of the contrac-
tual relationships between the lessor and the lessee destroyed the bargained for expectation of the
lessor in this instance. Id.
46. Under traditional contract law concepts, such unfairness has never been the basis for reliev-
ing a party of its contractual obligation when market fluctuations have made performance of the
agreement unprofitable. See Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1964). This
rule has been followed for many years in Oklahoma. See, e.g., Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Moss, 131
Okla. 49, 53, 267 P. 855, 859 (Okla. 1928); Clements v. Jackson County Oil & Gas Co., 61 Okla.
247, 250, 161 P. 216, 218 (Okla. 1916). It is worth noting that these cases distinguish between
physical impossibility, which can under certain circumstances justify avoidance of a contract, and
mere financial inability of a party to perform, which is no defense. Accordingly, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled in Clements:
Ifcontracts could be repudiated upon the mere allegation that the other party had no funds
[sic] there would, indeed, be much consternation in the business world, for it is common
knowledge that many persons worth large amounts and with extensive borrowing power
may be at some times without funds and yet far from insolvent and far from unable to meet
their contractual payments.
Clements, 61 Okla. at 250, 161 P. at 218.
47. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
48. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273.
49. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding, there is little justification for the court's conclusion
that the lessor and lessee could never have contemplated such a dramatic
increase of royalty to be paid from the producer's constant revenues.50
Such an intent should, where possible, be drawn from the wording of the
lease in dispute."' If the royalty were to be calculated upon the proceeds,
then language was readily available to these parties to so provide.
The court went on to rationalize its interpretation of market price as
"consonant with the intent and understanding of parties to oil and gas
leases."52 Whatever the intent and understanding of lessors and lessees
in general may be, there is no indication that evidence was introduced in
this case that these particular parties ever intended the royalty payment
to be based upon the producer's contract price. Further, the court deter-
mined its interpretation to be the only fair one for producers in general
although not unfair to lessors.53 This conclusion, of questionable validity
in determining the intent of the parties to the Hughey lease,54 is accurate
only to the extent that the court's underlying premises are acceptable. In
recognizing the binding nature of long-term gas purchase contracts in the
face of escalating gas prices,55 the court concluded that any other rule
would act to penalize the lessee who is required, by his duty to the lessor,
to market gas production.5
6
It seems apparent that the court's desire to equate the lease royalty
market price with the producer's contract price resulted in an interpreta-
tion of the disputed lease provision which, in addition to placing the les-
sor in a detrimental position, acted essentially to rewrite the lease to
conform to the agreement which the lessee might well have bargained for
50. An excellent discussion of such contemplation is found in the Fifth Circuit case of Piney
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 237 (5th cir. 1984); see also infra notes
191-212 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 219, 223 and accompanying text.
52. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274.
53. Id. The court noted:
Quite naturally lessors want to receive as much royalty as possible, but lessees in their own
interest seek as good a price as they can get for gas. As long as the contract was reasonable
when entered into, and as long as our law recognizes long-term gas purchase contracts as
binding in the face of escalating prices, the law should not penalize the producer who was
forced into the contract in large measure by his duty to the lessor [to market the gas].
Id.
54. The inquiry of the court should have been to determine the intent of the actual parties to
the agreement and not general intentions of parties in similar transactions.
55. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274.
56. Id. If the parties are to be charged with knowledge of marketing requirements for gas
production, certainly the lessee must be bound to know his duty to market gas production at the
time the lease is entered into. The lessee is not forced to enter into a market price lease, and subse-
quent enforcement of the known duty to market is not a basis for relief from an imprudent contract.
1985]
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had it accurately forecast gas price escalation. 7 It should be emphasized
that no such question was presented, nor needed to have been ruled
upon, in the context of this dispute. The court itself noted that the lessor
had not sought royalties based upon a price received by other lessors in
the field." Instead, the Hughey lessors attempted to make a case for the
recovery of royalties calculated upon the highest currently-paid price for
this particular gas, here the El Paso/Jarrett contract price which hap-
pened to reflect the FPC maximum ceiling price.
It would have certainly been a simple matter, and not inconsistent
with well-reasoned and broadly recognized authorities on this subject, to
deny relief on this basis. 9 Admittedly, in light of the availability of spe-
cific market value royalty provisions,' the market price term may mean
something else entirely. However, under the lessor's theory in this case,
the court had no need nor any obligation to determine market price to be
equivalent to the highest current price in the field. Such relief might
arguably have been permissible if evidence had been presented indicating
that the El Paso/Jarrett, or the FPC ceiling price, represented the fair
market value of the lessor's gas or at least some other equivalent which
could be fairly encompassed by the term "market price". No indication
appears in the court's decision, however, that any such theory was pur-
57. Interestingly, the earliest and the most recent cases from other jurisdictions have expressly
declined to alter a contractual relationship between the parties due to a perceived hardship. See
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984); Foster v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 85-92,
191-212 and accompanying text.
58. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272.
59. The jurisdictions which have followed a rule contrary to Tara and have sought to determine
market price based on evidence of comparable sales have looked to many factors to determine what
that market price might be. See, ag., Hugoton Prod. Co. v. United States, 315 F.2d 868 (Ct. Cl.
1963). The Hugoton court noted the following factors:
(a) The volume available for sale. Generally, the greater the volume or reserves, the
greater the price the seller could command.
(b) The location of the leases or acreage involved, whether in a solid block or scat-
tered, and their proximity to prospective buyers' pipelines.
(c) Quality of the gas as to freedom from hydrogen sulphide in excess of I grain per
100 cubic feet.
(d) Delivery point.
(e) Heating value of the gas.
(f) Deliverability of the wells. The larger the volume that could be delivered from a
reserve, the greater the price the seller could command.
(g) Delivery or rock pressure. The higher the pressure, the less compression for
transportation is required.
Id. at 894-95.
In the absence of any attempt to prove fair market price, the Oklahoma court would not seem to
have been under any compulsion to conclude that the fair market price was the highest price being
paid in the field.
60. Nonetheless, courts which have dealt with the terms "market value" and "market price"
have tended to treat the terms as interchangeable.
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sued or that any such evidence was presented. Therefore, a straightfor-
ward ruling that market price and the highest current field price were not
synonymous would have adequately disposed of the lessor's claim.
In going beyond the facts of the case by stressing the burdens of
long-term gas purchase contracts when only a two-year contract was
before it, the court's bias in favor of lessees becomes apparent. Having
divined the general understanding of hypothetical lessors and lessees
with respect to the necessity of long-term gas contracts, the court con-
cluded that neither lessor nor lessee could possibly have contemplated
holding the producer under a market price gas royalty clause to an in-
creasing price in the field while the lessee's own revenues were fixed by its
gas contract.61 On the other hand, an opposite conclusion is equally
justified. The lessee, here a corporate producer, must certainly be
charged with knowledge of its duty to market gas production and of the
possibility of binding long-term gas contracts. If the lessee, in its agree-
ment with the lessor, wished to limit its liability to a fixed portion of its
proceeds under its gas contract, it is reasonable to believe that any pru-
dent lessee would have done so. It is not consistent with the reasonable
intentions and care attributable to lessees in general in negotiating their
leases62 to believe that, in the face of these recognized market conditions,
the lessee would have been content to rely upon a market price clause to
achieve this end.
Finally, the court limited the applicability of its equation of lease
market price and gas contract price to those instances where the contract
was fair and reasonable at the time it was entered into.63 Such a limita-
tion is superfluous, however, since the gas contract must have been nego-
tiated at arm's length to prevent the possibility of fraud arising from
illusory or collusive dispositions of gas production. Accordingly, where
the lessee enters into a gas purchase contract with a related entity, which
entity in turn resells the gas at a higher price, the lessor's royalty must be
calculated upon that higher price.64 However, as has been observed by
subsequent case law highly critical of the Tara decision,65 a lessee always
has the obligation to market the gas diligently and in good faith.66
61. Id. at 1273.
62. See infra notes 201-05, 237 and accompanying text.
63. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274.
64. Id.
65. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 237 (5th Cir. 1984);
Matzen v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 233 Kan. 846, -, 667 P.2d 337, 344 (1983).
66. As was noted by the Fifth Circuit in Piney Woods, the lessor would not be bound by a
contract price which had not been negotiated in good faith. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 235.
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Therefore, these limitations upon the court's decision in no sense reduce
the basic unfairness arising from the rewriting of the Hughey lease to the
benefit of the lessee and the detriment of the lessor.
Subsequent sections of this Article will deal with decisions preceding
and following Tara, the majority of which have found the reasoning em-
ployed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to be unpersuasive. 67 In fact,
the court in Tara noted authority from four jurisdictions which have
held to the contrary68 while failing to cite any relevant authority in sup-
port of its decision. The court did find its holding to be consistent with
an earlier Oklahoma case, Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission,69 as well as a Tenth Circuit case, Pierce v. Texas Pacific Oil
Co..70 Nevertheless, neither of these cases deals with the basic underly-
ing issue of Tara, the intent of the parties to an oil and gas lease.
Apache Gas Products construed a provision of the Oklahoma Gross
Production Tax Act7" regarding the calculation of gross production tax
upon gas sold under circumstances where the sales price failed to repre-
sent the prevailing cash price for gas of the same kind, character, and
quality in the field. 72 The court ruled that the tax should be applied to
gross proceeds realized from gas purchase contracts except where the
contract was not entered into at arm's length or was not the result of
reasonably prudent bargaining. 73 While it is apparent that some of the
underlying reasoning overlaps that of Tara,74 the decision in Apache Gas
Products centered entirely upon the construction of a statute in light of
legislative intent7' and has no applicability to determining the intent of
the parties in entering into an oil and gas lease. Interestingly, in reaching
its decision, the Apache Gas Products court drew upon a similar Texas
statute, plus Texas cases construing the statute.76 The irony is that mar-
ket value royalty disputes have been commonly litigated in Texas, and its
courts have consistently rejected the type of argument and oil and gas
67. See, eg., infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69. 509 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1973).
70. 547 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1976).
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1009 (1981).
72. Apache Gas Prods., 509 P.2d at 110.
73. Id. at 116.
74. The Gross Production Tax Act dealt with gas sales which were not at the prevailing price,
and the court was faced with the difficulty of determining prevailing price at the time of production
in the face of fixed price, long-term gas contracts. Id. at 113.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court cited the Texas decision of W.R. Davis, Inc. v. State, 142 Tex. 637, 180
S.W.2d 429 (1944, no writ), construing what is described as the Texas counterpart of the Oklahoma
statute, Tax. STAT. ANN. art. 7047b (Vernon 1941).
[Vol. 20:519
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lease construction accepted in Tara.7
Unlike the decision in Apache Gas Products, the Tenth Circuit deci-
sion in Pierce presented a closer question to that involved in Tara. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted an Oklahoma statute
regarding oil and gas communitization 78 as construed by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission.79 The deci-
sion in Pierce is inextricably entwined with legislative intent and judicial
construction of the Oklahoma statute in question.8 0 In fact, the Tenth
Circuit noted that even if the intent of the lessor in entering into his lease
were appropriately considered, the lessor had argued that he intended to
have a market price, as distinguished from a gross proceeds, lease.81 The
court dismissed this argument as having no effect, observing that, even if
the lease contained a market price royalty clause, market price and gas
sales contract price are synonymous.82 Since the Apache Gas Products
case does not, on its face, address lease construction, it is not unreasona-
ble to suggest that the Tenth Circuit's reliance was misplaced. The deci-
sions in Apache Gas Products and in Pierce come full circle when relied
upon by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tara as applying inapplicable
facts and inapplicable law to reach a result which is unfortunately detri-
mental to the mineral owners of Oklahoma.
III. CASE LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Tara court noted that other jurisdictions had taken a contrary
view when in fact, at that time, no other court had reached the rule to be
established in Tara that market price and proceeds are equivalent in an
oil and gas lease royalty clause.83 Since Tara, only Arkansas clearly and
without reservation adopted the Tara rule; however, even Arkansas has
subsequently retreated from its earlier pro-Tara stand.84 The remainder
of this Article will reexamine Tara in light of the case law of the other
77. See infra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(d) (1969) (amended by OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(d) (Supp.
1984).
79. 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1963). This decision is commonly known in the industry as the
Blanchard Case.
80. The royalty obligations under the communitization statute interpreted in Pierce arose by
statute, and should, in logic, not be controlling with respect to a question of determining the intent of
the parties to a lease.
81. Pierce, 547 F.2d at 521.
82. Id. (citing Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109 (Okla.
1973)).
83. See infra notes 85-92, 101-16, 123-31, 142-53 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions, and will suggest criteria by which these disputes may be
resolved by ascertaining and enforcing the intent of the parties.
A. Interpretations Under Texas Law
1. Foster v. Atlantic Refining Company
In the mid-1960's, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, applying Texas law, rendered two decisions which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Tara described as "seminal" on the market value roy-
alty question."5 While both of these cases were rejected in Tara, they are
the foundation of a solid and continuing line of authority defining "mar-
ket value". In Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co.,86 the court applied Texas
law in the construction of a market price gas royalty clause. The dis-
puted royalty clause in the Foster lease provided royalties for gas "at the
market price therefor prevailing for the field where produced when
run."' 87 The lessors in Foster were thus armed with fairly precise lan-
guage in seeking increased royalties above their percentage of the pro-
ceeds under the lessee's 20-year gas sales contract. As a result, the court
was interpreting lease language considerably more explicit than the lan-
guage construed in Tara. The court had no difficulty in finding the obli-
gation of the Foster lessee to be express and without ambiguity. 88 As
such, the lessee was presumed to be fully aware of the possibility of a
divergence between its gas contract price and the market price for gas
prevailing in the field at the time when the gas production was run. The
court did not find the lessee's failure to protect its profit from increases in
85. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272 n.4 (citing J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.
1966); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964)). Although these are not the earliest
cases discussed in this Article, the earlier cases, arising out of Louisiana, involved an inverse of the
market conditions which existed during the Tara dispute, ie. market prices significantly below the
lessee's gas contract proceeds. See infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
86. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964). In as much as this Article is highly critical of the result in
Tara, in all fairness, an important distinction will be discussed with respect to Foster namely, the
more precise language of the lease royalty provision.
87. Id. at 488. Such precise terminology avoids the argument that market price royalty is to be
calculated at a value fixed at the time of the lessee's gas contract.
88. Id. at 489. The court pointedly observed:
The inability of [the lessee] to make a gas sales contract with escalation provisions is beside
the point. The obligation of [the lessee] to pay royalties is fixed and unambiguous. It made
the gas sales contract with full knowledge of this obligation and did nothing to protect
itself against increases in price. The fact that its purchaser would not agree to pay the
market price prevailing at the time of delivery does not destroy the lease obligation.
Id. The Foster court did not, therefore, indulge in a result-oriented type of judicial construction of
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the market price of gas to constitute justification for rewriting the lease,8 9
even though the court was not unmindful of the realities of marketing gas
production, particularly the necessity of entering into long-term gas con-
tracts.90 Nonetheless, while the Oklahoma court in Tara accepted mar-
ket place realities in relieving the Hughey lessee of the burden of the
contract it had made,91 Foster recognizes that established principles of
law prohibit judicial restructuring of a contract simply because the obli-
gations of one of the parties has become "financially burdensome." 92
2. J.M. Huber Corporation v. Denman
Two years after Foster, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
was again called upon to apply Texas law to a market price royalty
clause in JM. Huber Corp. v. Denman.93 The gas royalty in question
arose from production from different leases, with the greatest part of the
production from a lease providing for royalty based upon the market
price of gas produced from the well.94 The remaining leases provided a
royalty calculated on "the market value in the field."95 The court failed
to find any significance in the distinction between market price and mar-
ket value.96 As in Foster, the Huber court did not encounter any diffi-
89. Id. The language of the court, which has been subsequently quoted by many of the deci-
sions following this rule, is centered around the traditional concepts of performance of financially
burdensome contracts:
Stripped of all the trimmings [the lessee's] position is simply: We cannot comply.
This is no answer. The lease calls for royalty based on the market price prevailing for the
field where produced when run. The fact that the ascertainment of future market price
may be troublesome or that the royalty provisions are improvident and result in a financial
loss to [the lessee] "is not a webb of the Court's weaving." [The lessee] cannot expect the
court to rewrite the lease to [its] satisfaction.
Id. at 490 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196, 198 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
714 (1946)).
90. Id. at 488. The court noted further that the claim by the lessee that the long-term contract
was not improvident when entered into begged the question. Id. at 488-89.
91. See supra notes-41-51 and accompanying text.
92. Foster, 329 F.2d at 489-90. The court emphasized that when the lessee "made the gas sales
contract, [it] took the calculated risk of that contract producing royalties satisfactory to the lease
terms." Id. at 489.
93. 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966). The decision is reported in conjunction with Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966), a dispute involving different parties but
concerning the same issues with respect to market price royalties. Weymouth also presented an early
consideration of the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to determine royalty rates with
respect to gas sales in interstate commerce. Id. at 101-03. The history of this controversy, ulti-
mately resolved in favor of the applicability of state law to lease clause interpretation, is discussed
fully by the Kansas Supreme Court in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). See infra note 123.
94. 367 F.2d at 106.
95. Id. at 107 n.4.96. Id. at 107 n.5, 109-10.
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culty in accepting a recognized definition of market price. Accordingly,
the lessor was entitled to a royalty based upon current market price-a
price arising from an arm's length transaction between willing seller and
purchaser, the one not being compelled to sell nor the other compelled to
buy.9
7
Perhaps in recognition of the obstacle raised by the decision in Fos-
ter, the lessee in Huber made no attempt to equate the disputed market
price clause with a proceeds royalty clause. Instead, the lessee urged that
the purchaser under its gas contract constituted the sole market for this
gas; therefore, the gas contract price and market price, as that term was
used in the leases, were one and the same.98 However, evidence of a
rejected draft of the disputed lease revealed that the market price clause
ultimately entered into had replaced an express royalty provision based
upon "net proceeds derived from the sale of gas." 99 Where the parties
themselves, through extensive negotiations aided by experienced oil and
gas lawyers, had recognized a difference between a proceeds clause and a
market price clause, the court could not find it within its province to
disregard such a plain and obvious distinction."
97. Id. at 109. The court held:
But the "market" as the descriptive of the buyer or the outlet for the sale is not synony-
mous with its larger meaning in fixing price or value. For in that situation the law looks
not to the particular transaction but the theoretical one between the supposed free seller
vis-a-vis the contemporary free buyer dealing freely at arm's length supposedly in relation
to property which neither will ever own, buy or sell.
Id. While applying this traditional definition of market price, the court noted that the highly regu-
lated gas industry presented with something less than a free market. Id. at n.14 (citing Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966)).
98. Huber, 367 F.2d at 109. In fact, the lessor had required a gas purchase contract to be
entered into as a condition precedent to, and as partial consideration for, the lease. Id. at 110.
Accordingly, the lessee argued that the lessor's actions in acquiring the particular gas contract in
question constituted an adoption and ratification of the lessee's contract as the sole market, as well as
an estoppel to assert any other market in this context. Id. at 109.
99. Id. at 109.
100. Id. Contrary to the Oklahoma court's suggestion in Tara that market price is a term
fraught with ambiguity, the Huber court viewed the expressions of market price and market value to
be generally well recoguized in oil and gas law, and to be given their literal meaning. Id. The court
did not discuss the construction of the language of the clause in terms of an ambiguity. Rather, the
court examined whether the language was meant in its usual and ordinary sense, or as urged by the
lessee, in an altered sense dictated by the conduct of the parties. Contrary to the lessee's position,
the Huber court found ample evidence that the parties themselves intended the ordinary meaning of
market price:
[T]he Lessee-Producer's reported declarations made through its general counsel-a voice
not only of management, but with an articulate awareness of the significance of legal
terms-clearly put its construction of a market, not a proceeds, basis on this royalty clause.
There were similar representations made to the FPC that under its gas leases "it is obli-
gated to pay royalty based on the market price at the wellhead."
16
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3. Texas Oil & Gas Corporation v. Vela
The Supreme Court of Texas squarely addressed the construction of
a market price royalty clause in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela. t0 t This
1968 decision involved a lease and a gas purchase contract created for a
term co-existent with the life of the lease."t 2 Interestingly, the Vela lease
contained a combination of the various types of royalty provisions-mar-
ket price, market value, and net proceeds. 10 3  The dispute, however,
arose from the construction of the royalty clause pertaining to wells
which produced gas only and which provided for payment to the lessor
based upon market price.
The Texas Supreme Court was confronted with arguments similar
to those raised by the lessee in Foster, as well as those which were to arise
subsequently in Tara. Indeed, the facts in Vela appear much harsher to
the lessee than those presented in Tara. The gas contract price in Tara
was applied to satisfy the market price royalty clause as long as the con-
tract was found to be fair and reasonable at the time it was entered
into." On the other hand, the gas contract in Vela was entered into
with the only purchaser of gas in the field and at the only price avail-
able."5 Thus, the lessee's arguments regarding the necessity of long-
term gas contracts were buttressed by the availability of but a single mar-
ket. Further, it was accepted on appeal that the Vela lessee's gas con-
tract was entered into in good faith and in pursuit of its duty to market
gas produced under the lease. 1
0 6
Despite these apparently harsh mitigating circumstances, the court
appeared to reach easily the conclusion that the terms of the lease were
plain and that the use of various combinations of royalty provisions evi-
denced the parties' ability to provide for a proceeds royalty when de-
101. 429 S.W.2d 866 (rex. 1968, no writ).
102. Id. at 868.
103. The royalty on gas from oil wells and used by the lessee for the manufacture of gasoline was
based upon market value; the royalty for such gas sold by the lessee was based upon net proceeds.
Id. at 870-71. The operative provision in dispute, however, concerned a royalty from gas wells
which was to be based upon market price. Id. at 868.
104. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274. See also supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
105. The Vela court described the market conditions in the following manner:
When the Nordan & Morris contracts were made, however, United was the only com-
mercial purchaser of gas in the field. The operators could market their gas only on a "life
of the lease" basis, and the price stipulated is the only price that could be obtained at that
time. [Glas [was] not sold on a day-to-day basis, and. . . any substantial volume [could]
be marketed only under a long-term contract that fixe[d] the price to be paid throughout its
term.
429 S.W.2d at 870.
106. Id. at 870, 876.
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sired.107 Consequently, the gas contract price did not necessarily
coincide with the market price. That the plain wording of the lease re-
sulted in financial burden to the lessee did not excuse performance of the
lessee's obligation to pay royalty to the lessor based upon a market
price108 determined by comparable sales of gas in time, quality, and avail-
ability of markets.109
4. Exxon Corporation v. Middleton
The Texas Supreme Court relied heavily upon its holding in Vela to
resolve a different lease construction problem in Exxon Corp. v. Middle-
ton.11° This 1981 decision required a determination of whether a sale of
gas in the field, but not on the leased premises, was a sale either at the
well or off the premises.' Therefore, Middleton does not actually shed
any light upon the question of whether the lease market price equals the
producer's gas contract price.
The thrust of the lessee's position in Middleton, however, had the
same effect as the market price versus contract price dispute in Tara.
The lessee asked the court to find that gas had been sold within the
meaning of the market price royalty provision at the time the lessee's gas
contract was entered into, rather than at the time the production was run
and delivered to the purchaser. 1 2 This position would necessarily have
107. The court stated:
It is clear then that the parties knew how to and did provide for royalties payable in
kind, based upon market price or market value, and based upon the proceeds derived by
the lessee from the sale of gas. They might have agreed that the royalty on gas produced
from a gas well would be a fractional part of the amount realized by the lessee from its sale.
Instead of doing so, however, they stipulated in plain terms that the lessee would pay one-
eighth of the market price at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises.
Id. at 871.
108. Id.
109. The court, as had the Tenth Circuit in Foster, rejected any implication that the market price
was based upon the gas having been sold at the time the contract was entered into, accepting instead
the time of delivery as the focal point for determining comparable sales. Evidence of such compara-
ble sales was presented in the form of expert testimony based upon a mathematical average of prices
paid in the field. Id. at 872. While the court indicated that such a mathematical average may not be
the best evidence of market value at a particular time, the expert's testimony, which had been sub-
jected to full cross-examination, was not rebutted and sufficiently supported the trial court's accept-
ance of the mathematical average as the market price of the lessor's gas. Id. at 873.
110. 613 S.W.2d 240 (rex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 619 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981-
Houston, dismissed per stipulation).
111. Id. at 242. The royalty clause in dispute provided for the market value of gas sold or used
off the premises and for the amount realized from a sale of gas sold at the well. Id. The court
determined, contrary to the lessee's position, that gas sold in the field, but not on the leased premises,
required royalty to be paid based upon market value rather than amount realized. Id. at 243.
112. This argument was based upon the practicalities of industry requirements of long-term gas
contracts. However, the Middleton court, as had the courts in Foster and Vela, rejected these mat-
ters as irrelevant to construction of the lease language, noting that, for the purposes of the gas
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resulted in the market price being fixed when the lessee entered into its
gas contract. Presumably, under this construction, while the gas con-
tract itself would not have been conclusive with respect to market
price," 3 the market price would not have been affected by fluctuations in
price occurring long after the commitment of the gas production to a
long-term contract.
The Texas court found the lessee's arguments concerning the practi-
calities of gas marketing unconvincing. Rather, the lessee's arguments
were apparently construed as simply another approach attempting to
avoid burdensome obligations under the lease resulting from the lessee's
failure to protect itself in negotiating its gas contract from market
fluctuations. 4
Regardless of whether the Texas court's determination of when gas
is sold within the meaning of a royalty clause is viable in Oklahoma, 1 5
Middleton exemplifies the unwillingness of courts to rewrite plain and
unambiguous contract terms. The court in Tara would have benefited
from recognizing, as did the court in Middleton, that "[i]f the parties
intended royalties to be calculated on the amount realized standard, they
could and should have used only a 'proceeds-type' clause."116
B. Interpretations Under Kansas Law
1. Waechter v. Amoco Production Company
In 1975, the Kansas Supreme Court determined a lessors' class ac-
tion suit for increased royalties in Waechter v. Amoco Production Co. 
117
contract, sale may have occurred upon the effective date of the contract. That concept would not
provide a basis for altering the plain language of the lease. Id. at 245.
113. The court adopted the definition of market value which was employed in Foster (citing Polk
County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918 ('ex. 1977), on remand, 560 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977-Beaumont)), as well as the Vela rule, see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text, regard-
ing proof of market value by comparable sales. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 246.
114. The court observed:
When Exxon negotiated the gas contracts, it took the risk that the revenue therefrom
would be sufficient to satisfy its royalty obligations. That subsequent increases in market
value have made these obligations financially burdensome is no reason to compel this
Court to disregard the plain and unambiguous terms of the royalty clause and rewrite it to
conform to the meaning that Exxon, as drafter of the language, says was intended.
613 S.W.2d at 245 (citing Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964)).
115. Because of the rule it set out in Tara, the Oklahoma court did not determine royalty obliga-
tions based upon market price at the time of the gas contract versus that price at the time of delivery
of the gas.
116. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 245 (emphasis in original).
117. 217 Kan. 489, 537 P.2d 228 (1975). For the purposes of the court's decision, the parties
agreed that the royalty clause apparently most common to the class would be applied to the contro-
versy. Id. at -, 537 P.2d at 231.
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The royalty in dispute was to be calculated based upon the proceeds for
gas sold at the well and based upon market value at the well for gas
marketed off the leased premises. Thus, Waechter presented a similar
dispute to that decided by the Texas Supreme Court in Middleton." 8
The Waechter lessor argued a somewhat novel approach that the terms
"proceeds" and "market value" as used in the disputed royalty clause
were intended by the parties to refer to an arm's length sale in an unregu-
lated field.119 However, the court noted that "'proceeds' was used only
in context with the phrase 'if sold at the well,' while the term 'market
value' was used in the alternative phrase 'or, if marketed by lessee off the
leased premises'."12 Thus, the court could find no ambiguity in the lease
terms which would necessitate additional interpretation.121 In finding
nothing particularly ambiguous in the terms "proceeds" and "market
value", and expressly declining to rewrite the lease contract in favor of
the lessor, the Waechter court exemplified a willingness to enforce an
expression of proceeds, as opposed to market value, resulting in a benefit
to the lessee. 122
118. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
119. Waechter, 217 Kan. at _, 537 P.2d at 248. The lessor's argument with respect to the intent
of the parties was as follows:
Appellees contend that when the royalty clause is considered as a whole it is clear the
parties intended those terms to be synonymous-that they meant the same thing in terms
of money. They say in the case of arms-length unregulated wellhead sale the market value
of the gas would naturally equal the proceeds from a well-head sale. They further say that
the 14.5o price fixed in the Shawnee County case is "the best evidence of the market value
or price for the gas for the period in question and would result in the 'proceeds' contem-
plated by the parties, where mentioned in the lease."
Id. Thus, the lessor's argument appears to have been that the money actually received for the gas in
question was not the proceeds within the meaning of the lease provision.
120. Id. at -, 537 P.2d at 249.
121. The court held:
[T]he intent of the parties seems clear from the language used in the contract and there is
no room for construction as urged. Nor do we see anything extrinsic in the case negativing
the parties' clearly expressed intent. They agreed the royalty should be one-eighth of the
proceeds if sold at the well. We cannot make a new contract.
Id.
122. This approach had previously been adopted by a Kansas court in Lippert v. Angle, 211
Kan. 695, 508 P.2d 920 (1973), involving a dispute over a market value at the well royalty clause for
gas sold from the lease premises. Lippert involved a lessee who was also the purchaser of the gas in
question. Id. at _ 508 P.2d at 922. The Lippert court rejected an argument that the lessee's con-
tract to sell the gas to himself established a unique market, thereby providing market value based
upon the lessee's division order/gas contract price. Id. at 926. Lippert established market value for
the purposes of a royalty clause based upon current comparable sales. Id. Also, as in Waechter, the
Lippert court rejected the lessor's argument that proceeds was equivalent to market value when such
a construction would have resulted in a greater royalty payment to the lessor. Id. at 925.
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2. Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation
The Kansas Supreme Court demonstrated again, two years after
Waechter, its resolve to enforce royalty provisions according to their ex-
press terms in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp. .123 The case required con-
struction of leases including market value and proceeds royalty clauses,
as well as royalties based on the proceeds for sales at the well and market
value for sales off the lease (which by now the court had dubbed
Waechter leases). 124 While factually quite complex, the ruling of Light-
cap, simply stated, is that a market value royalty is based upon the value
which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller in a free mar-
ket. 125 Likewise, a proceeds type royalty was held to be discharged based
upon the money obtained from the lessee's actual sale.126 Of further sig-
nificance was the Kansas court's failure to find any distinction between
royalty clauses based upon market price and market value.
127
One important conceptual consideration which would arise in the
yet to be decided Tara, absent from Lightcap, was a financially burden-
some long-term gas purchase contract vis-a-vis the theoretical market
123. 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). Lightcap contains an
illuminating discussion of the relationship of a highly regulated gas market to the problems
presented in construing market price leases. Beginning with an examination of Weymouth v. Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966), and J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d
104 (5th Cir. 1966), the Kansas court traced a number of federal decisions, concluding with FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974), where "market value" and "just and reasonable" rates for gas
utility regulation were considered as two separate and distinct concepts. Id. at 395, 397-98. The
court concluded that these federal cases stood for a rejectment of the argument that the existence of
a regulated ceiling price on gas establishes a maximum market value upon which a lessee's royalty
obligation may be based. Instead, the cases were construed to require that royalties were to be
determined under state law according to lease provisions, which royalties then become a component
cost in determining permissible FPC rates. Lightcap, 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 8. Any potential
unfairness to the lessee was considered to be mitigated by the availability of individual rate relief, in
the event royalty based on market value resulted in a lessee's costs being unusually high and in
excess of those contemplated by the regulatory rate structure. Id. at 7-8. See also Placid Oil Co. v.
FPC, 483 F.2d 880, 911 (5th Cir. 1973) (determination of royalty obligations of gas producers was a
matter of state law beyond the control of the FPC), af'd sub nom., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S.
283 (1974).
124. Lightcap, 221 Kan. at _ 562 P.2d at 9.
125. It may fairly be suggested that any statement of the ruling is subject to attack as an over-
simplification in that the seven ruling judges took four separate positions, which were then applied
cumulatively as applicable to six distinct royalty provisions. Nonetheless, this synopsis of the ruling
of Lightcap is accepted by most commentators. See, eg., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4,
§ 650.4, at 650.37.
126. Lightcap, 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 11.
127. For instance, one of the leases providing for royalty based on the market price at the well
was categorized as a market value lease. Id. Thus, Lightcap is in accord with the majority of deci-
sions which have not touched upon the possibility that some distinction between market price and
market value exists. While the Oklahoma court in Tara does not reach a distinction, the ruling was
limited to the construction of a market price clause, while a listing of other typical royalty clauses
included market value along with proceeds. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1272 n.3.
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value for the same gas. 128 The gas contracts in Lightcap provided for
escalation based upon a "fair, just and reasonable" price for gas pro-
duced in the field. 129 Pursuant to these contracts, an escalation price was
arbitrated by the lessee and its purchasers.13 Thus, the difficulties al-
leged in Tara that the producer-lessee's revenues remained fixed
although gas prices might fluctuate substantially was not a factor which
the court needed to address in Lightcap."'
3. Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Company
The Kansas Supreme Court openly rejected the Tara rule, and the
argument that a gas purchase contract price constitutes market price, in
Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co.. 132 The royalty clause construed in Holmes
was based upon "gross proceeds at the prevailing market rate." A nota-
ble distinction between Holmes and Tara arose from the disputed leases
having been executed subsequent to the gas purchase contracts.133 Rely-
ing upon Lightcap, the Holmes court applied the now familiar compara-
ble sales test in determining the royalty market value to be the highest
price paid for comparable gas in the area. 134 Thus, the Holmes court in
fact determined market value on the same basis that the Oklahoma court
rejected in Tara-the highest available area price.
Of all the royalty clauses disputed and discussed in this Article, the
Holmes royalty clause is arguably the most ambiguous because it em-
128. As previously discussed, the facts of Tara did not actually present such a long-term gas
contract, see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text; however, this industry practice obviously
played an important role in the policy considerations of Tara. See supra notes 55-56, 61-62 and
accompanying text.
129. Lightcap, 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 4.
130. Id. No other evidence of market value was introduced in the Lightcap dispute, and the
arbitrated gas contract price was accepted as the market value. Id.
131. The court cited Lippert v. Angle, 211 Kan. 695, 508 P.2d 920 (1973), in a reference which
indicated that independent evidence of market value based upon the comparable sales standard of
arm's length transactions would have constituted permissible proof of market value. Lightcap, 221
Kan. at _, 562 P.2d at 5. See also supra note 122 for a discussion of the facts and holding in
Lippert. The concept of a gas contract escalation clause based on a fair and reasonable price for the
particular escalation might work to prevent a gross divergence between contract price and present
market value if that fair and unreasonable price included elements such as present prevailing market
value in the context of the selling lessee's royalty obligation. In light of recent developments which
have led gas purchasers to seek to avoid paying their contract prices due to plummeting market
values, it may be suggested that contract escalations based upon actual prevailing market value could
have merit in protecting both sides to the gas contract from unexpected and detrimental effects of a
fluctuating market.
132. 223 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983).
133. Id. at _, 664 P.2d at 1338.
134. Id. at 1341 (citing Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977); Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. 1968); Lippert v. Angle, 211 Kan. 695, 508 P.2d 920 (1973)).,
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ployed both proceeds and prevailing market rate to describe the same
royalty calculation.135 Although the Kansas court did not label the roy-
alty clause as ambiguous, the decision suggests the existence of ambiguity
because the court applied a strict construction against the lessee, as well
as noting the absence of evidence of intent to equate gas contract price
and market value. 136
4. Matzen v. Cities Service Oil Company
Subsequent to the Oklahoma court's decision in Tara, the Kansas
Supreme Court was presented with a similar dispute in Matzen v. Cities
Service Oil Co..137 Here, for the first time, all of the policy considerations
presented by Tara were before the Kansas court. However, it does not
appear that the Tara lessee's argument equating royalty market price and
gas contract price was asserted in Matzen. This is perhaps understanda-
ble since the decision involved a class action determination requiring
construction of both proceeds leases and market value leases.13
Faithful to its earlier decisions, the Matzen court determined that
proceeds leases were controlled by the gas contract price, and royalty
under market value leases were held subject to the Lightcap rule-a price
which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller in a free mar-
ket.139 Applying the settled rule of evidence concerning comparable
135. A virtually identical royalty provision was considered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 397 (Okla. 1970), with respect to gas sold off the premises. The
Oklahoma court determined that such a provision invoked the rate at which gas is commonly sold in
the vicinity of the well, while noting that such a term implies the existence of a free and open market
composed of willing sellers and buyers. Id. at 398. Notably, although the issues of Tara were not
presented, the Oklahoma court, including Justice Lavender who issued the opinion in Tara and
Justice Hodges who concurred in Tara and wrote the opinion in Johnson, ruled in the latter case:
"The lessee is obligated to develop the commodity he has found so that it will bring the highest
possible market value." Id. at 399. This would seem to impose a greater duty upon the lessee than
that established by Tara in which the requirement was only that the lessee's contract be fair and
reasonable, and representative of other contracts negotiated in the field at the same time. Tara, 630
P.2d at 1274.
136. Holmes, 223 Kan. at -, 664 P.2d at 1342. The court does observe that the construction of
the lease arose from the lessees having provided and dictated its terms. This rule should be consid-
ered as an aid in construction, and should be applied equally against the lessor in the event the lessor
prepares the language giving rise to the dispute. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
137. 233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337 (1983).
138. Id. at -, 667 P.2d at 339.
139. Id. at 343-44. The Matzen decision was reached as a sequel to Lightcap in that Lightcap left
unanswered the question of determination of free market value in a regulated market. Although the
Lightcap court indicated that market value was subject to proof by any competent evidence, the
parties offered no such evidence, resulting in the arbitrated gas contract price to be accepted as the
market price. Id. at 342 (citing Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 449, 562 P.2d 1, 4
(1977)).
23
Conley: A Reassessment of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey--A Case of Tempo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
sales, 1" the Matzen court upheld the trial court's determination of mar-
ket value being the highest federal regulated price of new gas in the area.
In so holding, the court recognized that evidence of federally regulated
prices is probative in determining fair market value. It is particularly
notable that the Matzen court specifically recognized the Oklahoma rule
established in Tara, which it described as unpersuasive and insufficient to
support an abandonment of the Lightcap rule."'
C. Interpretations Under Louisiana Law
1. Wall v. United Gas Public Service Company
The earliest reported case within the scope of this Article is the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court decision in Wall v. United Gas Public Service
Co..142 Wall involved a dispute over a gas royalty clause, seldom seen
today, but which was common in the early days of gas production and
marketing. 43 The lease provided for a fixed payment of $200.00 per year
for each well producing only gas. However, it was further provided that
at such time as the gas was utilized or sold off the premises, the royalty
would be calculated on the "value of such gas calculated at the market
price." 1" The dispute arose when the lessee began transporting gas pro-
duction through private pipelines for approximately two miles, at which
point it was sold to an interstate pipeline company at 5.8¢ per Mcf. At
the same time, the lessees were paying royalty based upon 4¢ per Mcf, an
average market price in the field. 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court re-
jected the lessor's argument that, within the terms of the lease, market
price meant the proceeds which the lessee received for gas sold off the
premises. 4 6 Instead, the court determined that the evidence supported
an average market price in the field of 4o per Mcf, and that the lessee's
140. Id. at 344-45. Nonetheless, the Kansas court did not go so far as to limit market value to a
regulated ceiling price, a rule which has apparently been accepted in Louisiana. See infra notes 173-
76 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 344. Included with Tara in this rejection was the Arkansas decision of Hillard v.
Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982), discussed infra notes 179-90 and accompanying
text; and the Louisiana case of Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982),
discussed infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
142. 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934).
143. With gas having been considered as having little value as a marketable commodity in the
early days of the oil and gas industry, royalty clauses had not yet been developed to take into consid-
eration a royalty obligation calculated upon the lessee's marketing of the lessor's fractional share of
gas production. See KuNTz, supra note 8, § 40.2.
144. Wall, 178 La. at -, 152 So. at 562.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 563.
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royalty obligation was to be satisfied based upon this price.147
The Wall court apparently deemed the royalty provision ambigu-
ous, 148 and found nothing in the lease nor in the evidence which would
indicate the intent of the parties in using the term "market price". To
resolve the matter, the court relied upon Louisiana law that gas is re-
duced to ownership at the well head.149 Therefore, the court reasoned
that where gas is to be divided in kind, the division of the proceeds or
value should occur at the point and time of vesting of ownership-in
other words, at the well head.' As a result, the court found it reason-
able that the parties had intended the royalty to be calculated upon cur-
rent market price in the field.'' This conclusion was further supported
by the adoption of various definitions of market price, all of which em-
braced a concept of current market transactions.'
5 2
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Wall is the extent to which the
facts constituted a reverse image of those presented in Tara. In Wall, the
lessor found itself arguing, to no avail, that "market price" meant pro-
ceeds, as opposed to the lessor's argument in Tara that "market price"
was the equivalent of the current market price in the field. In light of the
volatile nature of the gas market, it is certainly conceivable that an
Oklahoma court could be faced with a circumstance similar to that
presented in Wall. Thus, it is interesting to speculate whether an
Oklahoma lessee with a market price royalty clause would be required to
147. Id. The court relied upon the following definition of "market price":
The actual price at which a given commodity is currently sold, or has recently been sold, in
the open market, that is, not at forced sale, but in the usual and ordinary course of trade
and competition, between sellers and buyers actually free to bargain, as established by
records of latest sales.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTMONARY) (emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 564-65. There was no specific ruling of ambiguity in the decision, and the court's
inquiry was not based upon any suggestion that market price meant anything other than its com-
monly accepted meaning. Id. at 563. The court pointedly noted that "market price" does not mean
an arbitrary price fixed by the lessee." Id. Instead, the attempt to define the intent of the parties
focused upon whether market price was to be determined at the well or at a remote market. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Arkansas, which followed Tara in one decision, followed a rule, contrary to that
reached in Wall, that a lease constitutes a present sale of gas in place at the time the lease is entered
into. See Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, _, 637 S.W.2d 581, 583 (1982); see also infra notes 179-
90 and accompanying text for further discussion of Hillard. The trial court in Wall had held the
royalty obligation to be based on the lessee's proceeds at a market removed from the leased premises
and less the expense of transporting the gas. Wall, 178 La. at _ 152 So. at 563. This ruling was
rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the basis of evidence which indicated that a market
value did in fact exist in the field, upon which the court based the royalty calculation in accordance
with its determination of the intent of the parties to the disputed lease. Wall, 178 La. at -, 152 So.
at 564-65.
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pay royalty based upon his proceeds where the market price in the field
had plummeted far below his gas contract price." 3
2. Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Company
Three years after Wall, the Louisiana Supreme Court was con-
fronted, in Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co., 54 with a dispute over
a royalty clause based upon the value of gas used or sold off the premises.
Neither party disputed that the royalty owners were entitled to payments
based upon market value. The court, therefore, applied the definition of
market value, which it had previously established in Wall, as the current
market price paid at the well or in the field.55 The court went further,
however, and, citing an earlier decision, 56 stated that such market price
lease clauses are clear from ambiguity and doubt.1 7
In addition to the royalty based upon the current market price at the
well or in the field, the lessors sought increased royalty based upon the
lessee's gas pipeline contract prices.158 In rejecting this argument, the
court observed that the evidence of market value introduced at the trial
clearly supported the lessee's allegations of market value in the field.' 59
Like Wall, the decision in Sartor relied heavily upon market conditions
under which the lessee was able to obtain very favorable pipeline gas
153. Of course, so long as the gas purchaser continued to honor its contract price, the lessee
would be placed in no difficulty and could continue to pay royalties on the basis of such proceeds. In
fact, however, the market price for gas in Oklahoma fields has, in many instances, currently fallen
below the price terms of some long-term gas contracts entered into at a time when prevailing prices
were substantially higher than at the present time. As such, sellers of gas are currently being pres-
sured to renegotiate their contracts, with the purchaser frequently relying upon the force majeure
clause of its contract to justify failure to continue to pay at the contract rate. Conversation February
26, 1985, with Mr. James R. Eagleton, Senior Partner, Houston and Klein, Inc., and current presi-
dent, Oklahoma Bar Association. Mr. Eagleton has practiced as a Tulsa trial attorney in oil and gas
litigation for over 35 years, and successfully represented a Creek County farmer in a royalty dispute
in Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978). For a discussion of this case, see supra note
34. In the absence of express language in a force majeure clause to include market price fluctuation,
however, courts have generally not been willing to excuse financially burdensome performance based
upon the traditional concept of force majeure as an unforeseeable condition beyond the control of
the performing party. See, eg., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283
(7th Cir. 1974).
154. 186 La. 555, 173 So. 103 (1937).
155. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
156. Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La. 287, 163 So. 103 (1935).
157. Sartor, 186 La. at -, 173 So. at 105. Interestingly, the court also cited Wall in support of
this proposition, in spite of indications in Wall that the lease language may have been subject to
construction with respect to the intent of the parties had evidence of record existed to justify defining
market value in a sense other than its commonly understood and accepted meaning. Wall, 178 La.
at _, 152 So. at 563.
158. Sartor, 186 La. at -, 173 So. at 106.
159. Id.
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contract prices in exchange for accepting certain onerous burdens from
those same contracts.
160
3. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corporation
In 1982, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Henry v. Ballard &
Cordell Corp.,161 which has been characterized as an adoption of the
same rule set out by the Oklahoma court in Tara.6z This dispute in-
volved four leases, all of which provided for royalty based upon market
value for gas sold off the lease, and two of which further provided for
royalty based upon proceeds for gas sold at the well.
While the lessors relied upon the court's earlier decision in Wall, the
Henry court treated Wall as factually distinctive 163 although, on the nar-
row issue of lease language interpretation, the two cases stand for abso-
lutely contrary positions. While Wall held market value to mean current
market value, 164 the Henry court treated the royalty clauses as subject to
an ambiguity arising from their failure to state expressly whether market
value meant current market value.165
In resolving the problem, the Louisiana court discussed at length
many of the same policy considerations underlying the rule of Tara.
166
160. Id. at 106-07. These burdens included the risk that the wells would continue to produce
during the term of the contract, and the potential for the necessity of drilling additional wells to
cover the demand gas contract in the event of failure of current production. Id. at 107. This poten-
tial arguably implies that the contract was not conditional upon adequate production from existing
wells to fulfill the contract requirements. One recent decision, applying the Uniform Commercial
Code to the sale of gas, may support the proposition that the failure of production from wells could
excuse performance under the concept of impracticability if the exhaustion of production is not the
seller's fault, was not foreseeable at the time of contracting, and was not assumed by the seller as a
risk of the agreement. Sunflower Elec. Coop. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131, -, 638
P.2d 963, 969 (1981).
161. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
162. See Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operations, supra note 4, § 20.03[2], at 20-32. Cf supra note
141 and accompanying text.
163. The dispute in Wall was said to have centered upon the place of the determination of mar-
ket price, whether in the field or at a more remote market. 418 So. 2d at 1336.
164. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
165. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1337. See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a previous deter-
mination by a Louisiana court that market value is a clear and unambiguous term. Even though
Henry refers to the Wall court's citations of common definitions of market value as dicta, id. at 1336,
those same definitions have been applied repeatedly in controversy over this issue.
166. Id. at 1338-39. It is worth noting that the purchaser was determined to be the only avail-
able market at the time the gas contract was executed. Id. at 1336. The same was true in Texas Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968, no writ). For a discussion of the Vela decision, see
supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text. The Texas court in Vela was uninfluenced by the un-
availability of a market subsequent to the execution of the lease and this condition was not deemed
relevant to the intent of the parties at the time the lease was negotiated. Id. at 870-71. See also supra
note 107. To the contrary, the Louisiana court in Henry seemed greatly concerned with construing
the lease based upon such subsequent market circumstances. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1338-39. Two of
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A careful reading of the decision does not, however, support an adoption
of lease construction such as was reached in Tara as a matter of law.
Unlike the court in Tara, the Henry court, having determined the royalty
clause to be ambiguous, indicated the propriety of considering extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties.167 Nonetheless, only the
lessees had presented any evidence that the parties had intended to fix the
market price at the time gas was committed to a sales contract. 6 8 Con-
sequently, the court observed that a different conclusion may have re-
sulted had the lessors proved that the parties had intended the royalty
clause to operate independently of the lessee's actual disposition of the
production. 169
Henry is a difficult case from which to draw general conclusions in
that the decision clearly revolved around extrinsic evidence of the intent
of the parties in entering into a particular lease. To this extent, the case
certainly cannot be criticized as subject to the same unfair assumptions
as were made by the Oklahoma court in Tara.
4. Shell Oil Company v. Williams, Inc.
The latest Louisiana Supreme Court decision construing a market
value royalty clause, Shell Oil Co. v. Williams, Inc.,"7 ° like the 1982
Henry decision, falls far short of expressly adopting the Tara rule. In
fact, Shell Oil does not even involve a proceeds versus market value roy-
alty clause.17 1 Two lease clauses were at issue, one providing for the
value of royalty gas calculated at the market rate prevailing at the well,
and the second providing for value calculated at the market price prevail-
the Henry leases pre-dated the 1961 gas contract while another was dated 1962 and a fourth, 1964.
Id. at 1335. The court referred to the leases having begun production in 1961 without further expla-
nation. 418 So. 2d at 1335, 1340.
167. Id. at 1340-41. Cf supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
168. The court observed:
We do not propose to penalize defendants' good faith compliance with their lease
obligations by requiring them to pay royalties based on a current, fluctuating, day-to-day
market value of gas several times higher than the price received by them in a sales contract
admittedly in the best interest of both lessors and lessees. Had plaintiffs shown that the
purpose of the market value royalty clause was to provide them with protection as to price,
regardless of what disposition is made of the gas by lessee and regardless of what price was
received, then we would arrive at a different conclusion.
Id. at 1340.
169. Id. One concurring opinion of Henry further supports a reading of the case as failing to
establish a rule that all parties to market value leases will be deemed to have intended that term to be
synonymous to the gas contract proceeds but constituting only a determination of the intent of these
particular parties based upon the evidence. 418 So. 2d at 1341 (Calogero, J., concurring).
170. 428 So. 2d 798 (La. 1983).
171. Id. at 799.
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ing at the well. 172
These expressions of market value, by stipulation of the parties and
by evidence of record, were determined to refer to current market
value. 173 However, the lessor contended the current value to mean the
current price on the open, unregulated market at the time of production.
The lessee, on the other hand, argued that because the gas had been ir-
revocably committed to an interstate market, the only comparable sales
for market value were those in the interstate market.174 The Louisiana
court 75 sided with the lessee, determining that comparable sales for evi-
dence of market value must reflect the legal characteristic of whether the
gas is sold on a regulated or unregulated market. 7 6
This decision again, as in Henry, makes operative the express intent
of the parties regarding the definition of market value.17 7 Shell Oil, as
with the other Louisiana cases discussed here, appears to reach a proper
decision based on the individual facts and circumstances. Nonetheless,
Shell Oil adopts a rule of proof unfavorable to lessors whereas Henry has
been cited as adopting the rule of Tara.78
D. Interpretations Under Arkansas Law
1. Hillard v. Stephens
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Hillard v. Stephens,179 considered
172. Id. at 799-800. Since neither party asserted an ambiguity, this case does not throw any light
on conflicting decisions by the Louisiana court on this issue. See supra notes 148-52, 155-57 and
accompanying text. However, the Shell Oil court, in considering whether the parties intended that
the amount of the royalty might vary in accordance with price regulations, did expressly state that
the lease provision in question was not ambiguous. Id. at 803 (citing California v. Southland Roy-
alty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978)).
173. Shell Oil, 428 So. 2d at 799.
174. Id. at 802 (citing Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1981, no writ)).
175. Cf. Matzen v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 233 Kan. 846, _, 667 P.2d 337, 344-45 (1983) (market
value is determined based on highest federal regulated price). See generally supra notes 13741 and
accompanying text.
176. Shell Oil, 428 So. 2d at 802. This decision, construing rights and obligations of the owner
of gas with respect to the FPC, does not appear to support the rule that subsequent federal regula-
tion of gas may be a basis for altering what has otherwise been accepted as unambiguous lease
language.
177. Id. at 803. Still, the court's construction of the method of proof of market value supported
the lessee's position and determined the applicable market for comparable sales with respect to con-
ditions arising after the lease was entered into.
178. See, eg., Lowe, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil and Gas Law: Issues of the Eighties,
supra note 4, at 6.
179. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982). The result of this decision is particularly questiona-
ble as supportive of the Tara rule since the disputed lease initially provided for royalty at the rate of
five cents per one thousand cubic feet. The phrase five cents was stricken out and the words "pre-
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the construction of a royalty clause based upon the value of gas sold off
the premises at the prevailing1 80 market rate at the well. The lessor
sought a royalty computed on a daily basis 181 of the current market value
in the field. The lessee assumed the Tara producer's position that the
prevailing market price at the well was determined by its gas contract
price.
The Arkansas court accepted the lessee's argument in full. Relying
heavily upon the ruling in Tara, the court emphasized the lessee's duty to
market and the economic necessity of entering into long-term gas
purchase contracts. 8 2 Based on these considerations, the court held
"prevailing market price at the well" to mean a market price based upon
the producer's gas contract price.1 83 Further, such an interpretation was
inferred to be "consistent with the intent and understanding" of the par-
ties involved.184 Similarly, as in Tara,'85 the Hillard court limited its
ruling to situations in which the gas purchase contract was fair and rea-
sonable when entered into in light of other contracts negotiated at the
time in the field.' 86
It is worth noting that the court's ruling in favor of the lessee began
with a ruling that a "gas lease constitutes a present sale of all of the gas in
place at the time such lease is executed . . . ."I" This is not the law of
vailing market price at well" inserted. Id. at _, 637 S.W.2d at 582. The language, therefore, did not
result from the use of a printed form but was deliberately inserted by the parties. Under these
circumstances, the trial court ruled that the term market price should be considered in its common
and ordinary sense. Id. at 586. If, as the appeals court found, the disputed language was ambiguous,
then a factual question of intent arose. A remand to determine the factual issue would have been
appropriate since the opinion indicated an abundance of testimony which was not considered be-
cause of the trial court's finding of a clear meaning from the express language used. Id. at 586
(Hickman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, the decision recites evidence indi-
cating that it was the lessee that prepared the lease with the altered language providing for market
price, and also that the lessee was familiar with the use of proceeds leases. Id. at 587.
180. An additional basis for questioning the results of this case is the express use of the term
"prevailing" as modifying market rate. Such language is not as precise as the provisions for "pre-
vailing rate in the field when run" found in the early Texas decision of Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964). For a discussion of the Foster decision, see supra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text. Still, a construction that the provision was intended to refer solely to the gas
contract price as established at a fixed rate strains the logical and reasonable meaning of the term
"prevailing" quite beyond reason.
181. Hillard, 276 Ark. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 583.
182. Id. at 584-85 (quoting Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981).
183. Id. at 585.
184. Id.
185. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274.
186. Hillard, 276 Ark. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 585. It should be noted that, unlike in Tara, there
was evidence of a substantial number of gas contracts in the area. Id. at 584; cf Tara, 630 P.2d at
1274, and supra note 60 and accompanying text.
187. Hillard, 276 Ark. at _ 637 S.W.2d at 583.
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Oklahoma;.88 however, this concept does not appear critical in the ruling
in Hillard. Thus, beyond its initial discussion of the basic nature of oil
and gas leases, the Arkansas court expressly cites Tara, and clearly
adopts the same rule on the same grounds. 189
2. Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Harris
The Arkansas court's decision on Hillard, standing alone, clearly
embraces the Tara rule in its entirety. However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court in late 1984 decided Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Harris,9 '
which casts considerable doubt over the stance the Arkansas court will
take on this question in the future.
In Diamond Shamrock, the lease in question was entered into July 1,
1977, at which time the lessee Diamond Shamrock was already a party to
a long-term gas purchase contract with Arkla, Inc., dated December 7,
1971. This contract covered all production by Diamond Shamrock from
wells in an area including the acreage leased from Harris. The Harris
lease provided for gas royalty based upon market value at the well for
production sold or used off the premises, and based upon proceeds from
gas sales at the well. 1 ' The lessee argued that market value for gas pro-
duced from the Harris lease was established by the 1971 Arkla contract.
Harris sought to recover royalties based on market value. The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Harris was entitled
to royalty based upon market value, the best evidence of which was de-
termined to be the price paid other participants in the same well.
192
In support of its ruling, the Arkansas court pointed out that it
188. An oil and gas lease under Oklahoma law "does not operate as a conveyance of any oil or
gas in situ but constitutes merely a right to search for and reduce to possession such of these sub-
stances as might be found." Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 698 (Okla. 1979).
189. With respect to its ruling, the court held:
[I]t is the only interpretation that operates fairly for the producer. It is not unfair to the
[lessees]. As long as the gas purchase contracts were reasonable when entered into, and as
long as the law recognizes long-term gas purchase contracts as binding in the face of esca-
lating prices, the law should not penalize [the producer] who was forced into the gas
purchase contracts in a large measure by its duty to the [lessees] to market the gas effi-
ciently and effectively.
Hillard, 276 Ark. at -, 637 S.W.2d at 585.
190. - Ark. -, 681 S.W.2d 317 (1984).
191. - Ark. at _, 681 S.W.2d at 319. The dissenting opinion would have granted the lessor
royalty based on proceeds by finding that the gas production in question was sold at the well, and
applying the plain wording of the lease. Id. at 321 (Hubbell, J., dissenting). This question is not
addressed by the majority opinion, and no facts sufficient to determine this issue appear in the re-
ported text.
192. - Ark. at _, 681 S.W.2d at 319. No authority is cited; however, such a finding clearly
relies in some measure upon the concept of comparable sales for determination of market value.
1985]
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would be unfair to hold the lessor to a gas contract price which the lessor
was neither aware of nor a party to.193 This willingness to view the oil
and gas lease and the producer's sales contract as separate instruments,
without common parties, is a clear rejection of the Tara approach. Dia-
mond Shamrock further retreats from Hillard by suggesting a construc-
tion of the lease against Diamond Shamrock, the party that drafted the
instrument. 194 It is quite curious that Diamond Shamrock makes no ref-
erence to the earlier Hillard decision; therefore, any hard and fast con-
clusion regarding the approach the Arkansas courts will take on this
question in the future would, at best, be premature. Nonetheless, this
decision once again leaves Oklahoma the only jurisdiction which has not
approached this problem on an ad hoc basis, without regard for the ac-
tual intent of the parties to the lease.
E. Interpretations Under Mississippi Law
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Company
As clearly as the Arkansas court initially embraced Tara in Hillard
v. Stephens, the Oklahoma rule was rejected by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, in Piney
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.195 The disputed royalty
clauses provided for royalty based upon market value for gas sold or used
off the premises and based upon proceeds for gas sold at the well. 196 Af-
ter finding the gas was not sold at the well within the meaning of the
leases, the Piney Woods court embarked upon an extensive, well-rea-
soned, and well-supported decision of the meaning of market value as
used in these royalty provisions.' 97
193. Id. at 321.
194. Id.
195. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
196. Id. at 228.
197. The court referred to earlier problems having been subject to perceived grammatical ambi-
guities. Id. at 230 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 630 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Note, Henry v.
Ballard & Cordell Corp.: Louisiana Chooses a Point In Time In the Market Value Gas Royalty
Controversy, 43 LA. L. Rv. 1257 (1983)). Such ambiguities were apparently perceived by the Piney
Woods court as well because extrinsic evidence and rules of construction were employed to construe
the royalty provisions. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 233-38. For example, the court ruled:
But our decision that market value means value rather than proceeds is not simply an
instance of interpretation against the lessee. It is rather a holding that, although the roy-
alty clauses might have been less than lucid to laymen, they were quite readily understand-
able to those in the industry. Shell knew what a "market value" lease was and what a
"proceeds" lease was .... Shell "cannot expect the court to rewrite the lease to [its]
satisfaction".
Id. at 236 (citing Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, _, 637 S.W.2d 581, 587 (1982); Lightcap v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 457, 562 P.2d 1, 8 (1977)).
[Vol. 20:519
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The Fifth Circuit, rejecting the lessee's Tara type argument, 19
noted the uninterrupted line of authority upholding what the court re-
ferred to as the "Vela rule" which states that market value refers to value
at the time of production and delivery rather than the time when the gas
sales contract was entered into.1 99 The court elected to follow the Vela
rule based in part upon its determination that gas is not sold under a gas
contract until produced.2" Therefore, market value was held to refer to
the value at the time of production rather than at the time of execution of
the gas contract. The Fifth Circuit court went further, however, and
noted that the leases distinguished between gas sold at the well and gas
sold off the lease and between amount realized and market value. The
basis for the royalty must, therefore, be determined at the time of pro-
duction and delivery, not at the time a gas purchase contract is entered
into.2"' In finding this distinction significant when determining the in-
tent of the parties, the court declared that the Tara rule eliminated any
distinction between market value and amount realized, purportedly justi-
fied by the requirement that gas contracts be made prudently and in good
faith.202 However, this limitation to Tara was viewed as "illusory" by
the Piney Woods court since the duties to deal in good faith and to mar-
ket the gas also exist under a proceeds lease.20 3 As a result, the lessor
would not be bound to a lessee's contract price made in bad faith.2"
The court further rejected the interpretation advanced by leading
commentators that market value may never exceed actual proceeds.205 It
198. Id. at 237.
199. Id. at 233 (citing Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Lightcap v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Wall v. United
Gas Public Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87,
586 P.2d 298 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded,
(1981, dismissed per stipulation); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968, no
writ)).
200. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 234. Applying the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, the
court determined that gas under ground should be considered as future goods, id. (citing Miss.
CODE ANN. STAT. § 75-2-105 (1972)), and thus not a transfer of an interest in land. The court
found that gas purchase contracts are described by the UCC as a contract to sale, rather than a sale
(citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-107(1) (1972)). Oklahoma's statutes are identical. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 2-105(1), 2-107(1) (1984). In applying the traditional definition of market value
as reflected in evidence of comparable sales, the Piney Woods court concluded that such sales must
necessarily reflect market conditions at the time of production and delivery of the gas. 726 F.2d at
235.
201. 726 F.2d at 235.
202. Id. The court in Piney Woods could not accept this reasoning employed in Tara when the
lease before it distinguished between royalties based on the amount realized and those based on
market value. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Kretni Dev. Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497, 500 (10th Cir. 1934)).
205. Id. (citing Harmon, Gas Royalty--Vela, Middleton, and Weatherford, 33 INST. ON OIL &
19851
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is certainly true that the parties to a lease may so limit royalties but have
no obstacle in agreeing to a lease wherein the market value may in fact
exceed proceeds.2 °6 So noting, the court observed that the dispute before
it involved printed lease forms provided by the lessee which could easily
have provided for a proceeds basis had that been the true intent of the
parties.20 7 While the Piney Woods court engaged in some discussion of
the relative bargaining position between the parties, its decision would
have been better justified by the simple rule that an ambiguity will be
construed most strictly against the party responsible for it.20 8 If the lessee
chose to use a printed form lease which raised an ambiguity, it should
not be permitted to complain later that the court's construction goes
against it.20
9
The Piney Woods court also examined industry practices as an aid to
construction, elements of which are found in Tara.2 10 The lessee argued
that payment of royalties on proceeds had always been the custom in
Mississippi. The court, however, found no basis that such a custom ex-
isted. Additionally, the lessor was not found to have had any under-
standing of such a custom, the existence of which would have resulted
from royalty payments calculated by the lessee in a fashion obscure to
GAS. L. & TAX'N 65, 69 (1982); Lowe, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 117, 146-47 (1981)).
206. Any such obstacle imposed by judicial construction of the parties' contract would, however,
destroy the expectation interest of the parties in accepting the risks in exchange for possible benefits
of a fluctuating market.
207. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 235. The court noted further that "Shell and other lessees plainly
knew how to draft a proceeds lease." Id. n.12.
208. Id. at 235 (citing Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 238 Miss. 775, 786, 119 So. 2d 759, 761 (1960); 2
W. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 232 (perm. ed. 1959); 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 628 (1981)).
209. The court's discussion of this rule of construction which it describes as an established doc-
trine, including its continued viability in Oklahoma, 726 F.2d at 235 n.13 (citing Waldman, The
Demise of Automatic Termination, 54 OKLA. B.J. 2767, 2773 (1983)), is instructive but unnecessary
to the court's decision. However, in as much as the rules of construction dictated the same result
ultimately rendered in Piney Woods, it is clear that the court determined the plain meaning of the
lease language in the context of the purpose of the royalty clause in its entirety. Id. at 230.
210. The Fifth Circuit's decision goes beyond the customs of long-term gas contracts, further
examining contingents that royalties based on good faith contract prices had always been industry
custom in Mississippi. 726 F.2d at 236. The court also expressed reservations about the universality
of this custom, citing Shell Oil Co. v. Williams, Inc., 428 So. 2d 798, 799 (La. 1983), wherein this
same lessee, Shell Oil Company, stipulated that market value royalty is determined by current mar-
ket value. 726 F.2d at 236. The court further observed that such a stipulation is significant, not
because of any binding effect in the litigation, but as relevant to industry custom. Id. Relevant
custom is only that known to both parties. The court did not find any indication that lessors would
have had any way of knowing, and would, therefore, not be presumed to know that a lessee made a
practice of making royalty payments under market value leases at something other than current
value. Id.
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the lessor.21'
The court disassembled and rejected the policy arguments and pur-
ported fairness to both parties, relied upon by the Tara court,212 and
rejected as an intervention "on behalf of producers experienced in the
petroleum industry, and thereby depriv[ing] lessors of their legitimate
contractual expectations. ' 21 3  Instead, the Piney Woods decision recog-
nized those arguments as an attempt to relieve a party to a contract of
performance which had become burdensome.21 '4 Finally, the court ob-
served that the Tara rule, in addition to depriving the lessor of its ex-
pected market value royalty, also removes any incentive to renegotiate
the lease to reflect current economic circumstances.21 ' The Fifth Circuit
appropriately characterized such an approach as judicial law-making,
without regard to the intent of the parties, in rewriting the lease to the
satisfaction of the lessee.21 6
IV. COMMENTS, CRITICISMS, AND SUGGESTIONS
The judicial construction of any disputed royalty clause must focus
on the particular language before the court. Formulation of general
rules, such as the Tara holding that a market price lease and a proceeds
lease are equivalent in the presence of a fair and reasonable subsequent
long-term gas contract, does very little to advance the function of the
court--enforcement of the rights of the parties as provided by written
contract. The courts must deal with the individual language involved in
accordance with established principles of law and refrain from broad
211. Oklahoma case law supports the proposition that a knowledgeable party who knows or
should know that the other party to his contract is using a term in its ordinary sense may not fail to
disclose any special meaning which the other intends. See, eg., CMI Corp. v. Gurries, 674 F.2d 821,
824 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 161 (1984)).
212. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 237.
213. Id. (citing Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1964)). The court elabo-
rated noting that the role of the court is not to establish whether suffering an assumed risk is fair,
that assumption being a bargained for element of the agreement. Id.
214. 726 F.2d at 237.
215. Id. at 237-38. The court concluded: "By enforcing the clear terms of the market value
lease, we preserve those expectations and provide opportunities and incentives for the parties to
make new contracts more nearly reflecting current economic conditions." Id. at 238. Even in enforc-
ing the plain terms of the lease, the court recognized that performance may become so burdensome
to the lessee that economics would dictate an abandonment of the lease. Id. at 237. However, a
counterbalancing incentive is seen for the lessor to renegotiate to assure uninterrupted payment of
royalty from a present lessee who can continue production with existing lease facilities. Id. In as
much as the dispute arose from an excess of the market value over the existing gas contract price, the
lessee's purchaser may also have been induced to renegotiate than to seek different and more plenti-
ful gas sources. Id.
216. 726 F.2d at 237.
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generalizations based on the court's notion of what may or may not be
fair.217 With respect to the subject matter of a wholly integrated con-
tract, contracting parties have only such rights as their written agree-
ment, supplemented by established legal principles, gives them.21
Contracts which fix obligations and are to be performed within the con-
fines of a fluctuating market impose risks upon and grant expectations to
the parties.2 19 The fact that one party's risk has become a loss, thereby
ripening into the other party's expected benefit, is simply not a matter of
judicial concern. If performance of an agreement becomes so economi-
cally oppressive as to be impracticable or impossible, established legal
principles exist for determining the rights of the parties.220 Those princi-
ples do not, however, include the rewriting of contract language to reflect
what the court believes the parties might have agreed upon had it oc-
curred to them that the market would so drastically change, or had they
the benefit of hindsight in the market place.22'
The threshold question in enforcing a royalty lease clause is whether
217. The harshness of an agreement which, if enforced, imposes only the detriment of a risk
voluntarily assumed in the bargaining has never been an acceptable basis under Oklahoma law for
judicial modification of the agreement. See Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Rice, 99 Okla. 184, 187, 226
P. 324, 326 (1924). In the context of this Article, this assumes the propriety of determining the
definition of market price or market value to be clear and without need of construction by resort to
extrinsic evidence. On the other hand, excessive harshness is an acceptable consideration in constru-
ing an ambiguous term to the extent that such an ambiguity will not be resolved so as to result in
oppression or gross inequity. See Federal Land Bank v. Nicholson, 207 Okla. 512, 514, 251 P.2d
490, 493 (1952).
218. Again, the existence of an ambiguity will determine whether or not the burdens and benefits
of a written agreement will be subject to examination in light of extrinsic evidence. Absent such
uncertainty, the common and ordinary sense of the language used must be enforced. See Martin v.
Harper, 208 Okla. 303, 304, 255 P.2d 943, 945 (1953).
219. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
220. Oklahoma has accepted commercial impracticability as an excuse for nonperformance with
respect to sales of goods. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-615 (1984). However, oil and gas leases are
not subject to the UCC in Oklahoma. See Casper v. Neubert, 489 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1973)
(applying OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-105(1) (1984)). Still, other jurisdictions have softened the harsh
common law requirement of absolute physical impossibility, by analogy, to the commercial impracti-
cability concept of the UCC in order that the concept can be applied to oil and gas leases. See
Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: Part I, 14 U.C.C.
L.i. 30 (1981-82). Additionally, the UCC has been applied in more than one jurisdiction to a gas
sales contract. See, eg., Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1984); Sunflower Elec. Coop. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131, 638 P.2d 963 (1981). If the
court must look to the subsequent gas contract in determining rights under the lease, then the mod-
em concept of commercial impracticability affords realistic opportunity for relief from oppressively
burdensome agreements.
221. Oklahoma follows the universally accepted rule that a court will not make a better contract
for the parties than they have actually made, nor alter a contract to the benefit of one and to the
detriment of the other. See Williams Petroleum Co. v. Midland Coops., 539 F.2d 694, 696 (10th Cir.
1976) (citing Great Western Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell, 326 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1958)).
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the royalty clause is ambiguous.222 If the clause in question is reasonably
susceptible of more than one construction, when considered in the con-
text of the entire agreement, then an ambiguity is present.2 3 In such a
case, the court may look to many factors when determining the intent of
the parties, including parol evidence224 and the circumstances existing at
the time the agreement was reached.225 In the absence of any such evi-
dence, rules of construction are available to the courts to aid them in
applying a meaning to language in doubt.2 26  If, on the other hand, the
lease language is plain and expressed in commonly understood terms,
fairly susceptible of only one meaning, then it is the duty of the court to
enforce the intentions of the parties at the time of contracting as actually
expressed in the written language.2 27 In such a case, the court should
determine the rights of the parties from the language alone and without
regard to extrinsic evidence. In the absence of ambiguity, the court
should not speculate on what the parties surely must have meant.2 28
The Tara court did engage in this type of speculation to establish its
rule, which may yet return to haunt both Oklahoma courts and
Oklahoma gas producers. 2 9 Initially, it should be noted that neither the
Tara royalty clause, nor the dispute itself, involved any of the common
222. See Taylor v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 407 F. Supp. 69, 72 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Major v.
Bishop, 462 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1977)). Language is unambiguous only if reasonably and fairly
susceptible of one meaning. Id.
223. See Minor v. Blanton, 206 Okla. 382, 386-87, 243 P.2d 1008, 1012-13 (1952). Of course,
even in the absence of ambiguity, the court, in determining the intent of the parties as drawn from
the four comers of the written document, should attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the
positions of the parties when the contract was entered into. Id. at 387, 243 P.2d at 1013. Addition-
ally, the purposes and circumstances surrounding the transaction are a permissible inquiry in inter-
preting such express intent. Id.
224. 206 Okla. at 387, 243 P.2d at 1013.
225. Id.
226. The rule of construction most commonly seen in the Tara type of disputes is the application
of construction against the party who selected the disputed language. See supra notes 204-05 and
accompanying text. Still, the principal rule of construction is always to determine, and put into
operation, the intent and the object of the contracting parties. Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 3, 188 P.
347, 349 (1920). The court may not, under the guise of construction or otherwise, read into a con-
tract words or terms which are not fairly contained within its language. Phoenix Oil Co. v. Mid-
Continent Petroleum Corp., 177 Okla. 530, 533, 60 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1936).
227. See supra note 219.
228. See supra notes 214, 219, 222.
229. Such speculation was clearly involved in Tara. Abandoning the express language used, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "We do not believe that the lessors in this case, the original lessee,
or the assignee-producers ever contemplated that the lessors' royalty could be half of what the pro-
ducers received for the gas." 630 P.2d at 1273.
The case law of Louisiana is illustrative of a jurisdiction where disputes over market value
royalty clauses have risen in instances where market value fell short of the lessee's proceeds, as well
as where that value far surpassed the gas contract price. See supra notes 142-53, 161-69 and accom-
panying text.
37
Conley: A Reassessment of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey--A Case of Tempo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
variations which have given rise to claims of ambiguity. For example,
the gas royalty clause in question did not distinguish between sales at the
wellhead and sales off of the leased premises.230 Additionally, the deci-
sion does not reflect any alternative argument that, in the event market
price does not mean proceeds per se, it must mean a price set at the time
of the lessee's gas contract rather than a current prevailing market
price.23 Finally, Tara involved no argument or authority regarding
proof of market price either in a free or in a regulated market.232 In
short, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was simply requested to determine
the meaning of market price at the well, but instead expanded its decision
far beyond the facts before it.
For its rationale, the Tara court first noted the usual necessity of
marketing gas under long-term purchase contracts. The court believed
this industry practice to be known and considered by parties to oil and
gas leases when they are negotiating.233 From this, the court concluded
that the parties to the lease could not have intended that the royalty
fluctuate with market value while the lessee's gas contract price, subject
of course to escalation factors, remained constant.234 In accordance with
its speculation as to what the parties must have intended, the court then
held that the term market price at the well is ambiguous and that the
interpretation of market price as proceeds under these circumstances is
"consonant with the intent and understanding of parties to oil and gas
leases. 235
Reasoning that any other approach would constitute a penalty to
the lessee who was forced into a long-term gas contract by its duty to
market the lessor's gas, the court asserted the fairness of this rule to both
parties.236 This reasoning departs radically from established principles of
contract construction. An ambiguity in an agreement, if it exists at all,
must have existed at the time the agreement was entered into.237 An
230. See, eg., Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984);
see also supra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
231. See, eg., Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982); see also supra notes
161-69 and accompanying text.
232. See, eg., Matzen v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337 (1983); Shell Oil Co. v.
Williams, Inc., 428 So. 2d 798 (La. 1983); see also supra notes 137-41, 161-69 and accompanying
text.
233. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273. But see supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1274; see also supra notes 36-38, 52-53 and accompanying text.
236. Id. But see supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
237. A court will not conform a contract to the desire of the party manifested after the agree-
ment has been made. See Siler v. Read Inv. Co., 273 Wis. 255, 261, 77 N.W.2d 504, 509 (1956). To
allow a party to plead and prove subsequent matters is to provide, by judicial fiat, a shelter from the
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otherwise straightforward contract term may not be attacked on the
grounds that subsequent events have purportedly rendered that term un-
certain of meaning.23 By emphasizing the lessee's duty to market and its
being forced to enter into a long-term contract,239 the Tara court ap-
proached the problem from the wrong end. It may be that a lessee is
forced by market conditions into entering a long-term gas contract,
although that certainly did not prove to be the case in Tara. However,
even if the market conditions had rendered such a result, the lessee was
not forced to agree to a market price royalty lease clause. The lessee had
no obligation to the lessor at all until the lease contract was executed and
was not limited to market price language alone to provide for a royalty.
If notice of the usual practice in the industry is attributable to both par-
ties, certainly a lessee negotiating a royalty in 1973 was not only well
aware of the potential for marketing under a long-term contract, but also
of the modem wave of disputes over these types of lease clauses.2"
Under these circumstances, a lessee who provides for a market price
royalty clause, either in a lease prepared by the lessee, its draftsmen, or
attorneys, or in a printed form supplied by the lessee, must be considered
to have had the opportunity to limit the royalty obligation to its own
proceeds if desired.24 At least one noted commentator has referred to
such a rule of construction as a "knee jerk" construction against the
lessee.242 This is simply not the case. United States courts have histori-
cally and universally construed ambiguous contracts most strictly against
the drafter of the agreement, or the proponent of the printed form.243
This rule is neither unfair nor unreasonable. If, in the face of what the
Tara court deemed to be well-known industry practices, the lessee uses a
market price royalty clause, then the common meaning of the term
detriment caused by the failure of an assumed risk. See supra notes 210-12, 215-17 and accompany-
ing text. The fact that subsequent events have resulted in a dispute over contract language does not
make it ambiguous. See Needles v. Kansas City, 371 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo. 1963).
238. See Needles, 371 S.W.2d at 304.
239. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
240. As noted in Tara, several jurisdictions had previously determined similar disputes. See
supra note 3.
241. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
242. Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operations, supra note 4, § 20.03[2][c], at 20-34.
243. If, in fact, the term "market price" or "market value" is to be treated as ambiguous, extrin-
sic evidence should be admitted, including testimony of the parties and evidence of negotiation, in
clarifying the contract. This rule of construction against the draftor need only be resorted to in the
absence of such other evidence of intent. Certainly, the application of a rule of construction in this
fashion is less objectionable than determining the intent of parties to a particular agreement from the
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should be applied.2' The lessor would not then have bargained for con-
sideration of market value royalty to have it subsequently judicially
abridged because the lessee's performance is no longer profitable. As has
been noted earlier, the lessee's difficulty is not "a web of the Court's
weaving, "245 and the contract should not be rewritten to enhance the
lessee's profits at the expense of the lessor.
Nonetheless, the court in Tara could not bring itself to enforce the
contract against the lessee where it had become financially burdensome.
As the Fifth Circuit wryly noted in Piney Woods, with respect to Missis-
sippi law, the legislature may, if it wishes, enact a relief fund to assist
these short-sighted lessees.246 The courts should not deprive Oklahoma
royalty owners of the expected fruits of their bargains by judicial distor-
tion of unambiguous lease clauses. The term "market price" has long
had an established and accepted meaning,247 and market fluctuations
which are reflected in that price are foreseeable to lessees.248 The occur-
rence of such market activity should have no impact on the rights of
lease parties who have chosen to base their expectations of profit on the
direction the market takes during the term of the lease. To take into
account such an impact is an unwise interference with the bargaining
processes and business decisions of an experienced and established
industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The weight of current authority on the issue presented in Tara sup-
ports a rule that the terms "market price" and "market value" used in
gas royalty clauses are neither arcane nor ambiguous. There is little if
any authority that there is a distinction between the two terms. At a
minimum, courts of other jurisdictions have subjected such language to
extrinsic evidence and, as a last resort, to rules of construction as an aid
in determining the intent of the parties as actually expressed by the lan-
guage used. To the contrary, the Tara rule does a grave disservice to the
mineral owners of Oklahoma.
All of this notwithstanding, parties involved in the negotiation and
preparation of oil and gas leases should be extremely cautious in drafting
244. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 161 (1984); see also supra notes 207, 222.
245. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1964). The well-known nature of
the necessity of long-term gas contracts was recognized even in the earliest cases. See, id. at 488.
246. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 237.
247. See supra note 60.
248. See Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 237.
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provisions for gas royalty, taking into consideration all types of disputes
which these clauses have engendered. If the lessor's royalty is to be
based upon the lessee's actual revenues, then express language creating a
proceeds-type lease should be considered to be absolutely essential. On
the other hand, references to market price or market value should clearly
reflect the intent of the parties with respect to the time and place such
value is to be determined. The courts should not be left with the burden
of determining these questions, particularly in light of the staggering
amount of litigation over these very issues.
Without doubt, disputes may arise under a large number of leases
which were prepared and entered into long before Tara, and many even
before the advent of the case law of the last two decades. For resolution
of disputes which spring from these leases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
should, if given the opportunity, commit itself to the task of enforcing the
bargained for lease agreements according to their terms and the actual
intent of the parties. However well-intentioned the rationale of Tara in
seeking what the court perceived as fairness to both parties, the simple
fact is that any contractual relationship creating rights and obligations
for a marketable commodity carries with it the promise of expectations
come to fruition, as well as the potential for realization of loss from as-
sumed risks. It is not for the court to rewrite such agreements to the
satisfaction of either party simply because the failure of expectations and
the materialization of loss create an apparent unfairness. The reality of
the market place, when unhindered by judicial intervention, provides the
vehicle by which the parties to economically unrealistic agreements may
be stimulated to renegotiation to reflect more nearly current economic
conditions. Such an approach to a dispute, similar to the one faced by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tara, is more likely to lead to a fair and
just result than can possibly follow from the rewriting of oil and gas
leases by judicial decree. In the former instance, all parties and the gen-
eral market place stand to benefit. In the latter, as particularly demon-
strated by the Tara decision, the lessor is stripped of its bargain while the
lessee obtains a better agreement than it actually made, having stood
ready to accept the rights and benefits of its lease, but being relieved of its
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